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In this paper it is shown that the theory on (dis)equilibria with
quantity rationing, as developed recently by a.o. Dréze (1975), Benassy
(1977) and Barro and Grossman (1976), is appropriate to study economies
where production takes place under increasing returns to scale. We con-
sider a temporary equilibrium model with quantity rationing. There are
three commodities (a single good, labour and money). Consumers sell
labour, buy goods and hold money. The producer(s) use(s) labour as the
only input to produce goods. Profits are transferred to government and
there is a Pixed autonomous demand from government. This model was
studied a.o. by Malinvaud (1977), Bóhm (1978 and 1979), Dehez and Gabsze-
wicz (1977), Gepts (1977), Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand (1978).
A model with a single firm is introduced in section 2 and in section
3 the (temporary) fixed price eguilibria (also called "disequilibria" by
some authors) are studied under alternative assumptions on the production
function (decreasing returns, constant returns and increasing returns).
It has been shown (Malinvaud (1977)) that under decreasing returns to
scale there can exist four different types of equilibria (plus inter-
mediate cases): Walrasian, Classical, Keynesian and Repressed Inflation.
We show that under constant returns Classical equilibrium disappears and
that under increasing returns only Keynesian and Repressed Inflation
equilibrium (plus an intermediate case) can occur. This is so, because
in this case (the) producer(s) has always to be rationed in order to
limit the production. In section 4 we consider the same economy with in-
creasing returns but with different potential producers. A rationing
scheme Por distributing goods demand or labour supply among firms is in-
troduced by means of market share distributions. It appears that the
existence of a fixed price equilibrium and the type of equilibrium
(Keynesian or Repressed Inflation) that occurs, now also depend on the
set of firms that are active, or, if all firms are identical on the num-
ber of active firms. A stability concept of equilibrium w.r.t. the set
of active firms is introduced, by which an equilibrium is stable if no
1) I thank Jaques Dréze, Paul van den Heuvel and Pieter Ruys for helpf~ll
conversations. All remaining errors are mine.- 2 -
non active firm can profitably become active.
I prefer to interpret the model of this paper as a(very simple)
micro economic model (with aggregate consumption however), rather than
as a macro economic model, as is often done in the literature (e.g.
Malinvaud (1977)). Particularly in the case of increasing returns, it
seems not reasonable to aggregate implicitely over producers and a
fortiori aggregation over different commodities seems not acceptable.
It seems worthwile to study increasing returns, since there are no
firm grounds that decreasing returns are normal even in the short run.
Also it seems that some phenomena, frequently occurring in times of de-
pression, like forced mergers and failures of firms, could be better
explained if one assumes increasing returns. However, the use of a simple
short run model like the present one for the analysis of increasing
returns seems somewhat unrealistic, it has the advantage that some of
the typical problems related to this phenomenon can be made clear.
Obviously, if decreasing returns start only at a very high level of
production, a model with increasing returns is appropriate if this high
level is not attained by any producer.
2. The model.
Following Bóhm (1978), Dehez and Gabszewicz ( 1977) a.o., we consider
an economy with a set I of consumers, a single producer and an autonomous
consumer (government). There are three commodities: a consumption good,
labour and money. P is the price of the good. W the nominal wage rate
and M are the initial money holdings of consumers. In the short period
considered, consumers can spend M plus their labour income WR on goods
and final money holdings M~. The model will be formulated in terms of
real wages w- W~P , real initial money holding m- M~P and real final
money holdings m~ - M~~F .
The producer maximizes profit; the profit is transferred to the sutono-
mous sector (and not distributed among consumers). We consider fixed-
price temporary equilibria for different values of w and m.- 3 -
2.1. Consumers
Each consumer makes a plan for present and future trades of goods
and labour and consequently for money holdings. Only the first period
variables occur in the temporary equilibrium. The plan has to be chosen
from a budget set, determined by initial money holdings, the present
price and wage rate, present individual constraints on goods and labour,
expected future prices and wages and expected individual constraints.
Expectations on future parameters may depend on the present values of
these parameters and also on the aggregate constraints. This results in
individual constrained demand and supply functions for each consumer i,
and particularly in constrained functions of present goods and labour:
xi - Ei(P~W~Mi~~~~~x~R) ~
ki - ai(P.W~Mi~xi~Ri.x~~) ~
where xi and Ri are constrained demand and supply of goods and labour
respectively, xi and Ri are the individusl constraints on goods and
labour, i.e. the maximum quantities that could be bought and sold, where-
as x and R are the aggregate constraints. Given a rationing scheme, by
which individual constraints are determined from aggregate constraints,
aggregate demand and supply functions of all consumers can be defined.
This whole process (see Grandmont (1977) for a general treatment and
Bóhm (1979) and Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand (1978) in relation to a model
with rationing) is left implicit in the present paper. We shall introduce
demand and supply by aggregate functions. We shall assume that these func-
tions are homogenous of degree zero in P, W and M, so that they can be
expressed in terms of real wages w- W~P ~ 0 and real initial money
holding m- W~P ~ 0, hence it is also assumed that aggregate demand and
supply only depend on total real money holdings m- Em. and not on the
i
distribution among consumers.
Total demand x for the good and total supply R, of labour by consum-
ers are given by the constrained demand and supply functions:
(1) x - ~(w,m;x,R) ? 0 and L ~ R - ~(w,m;x,k) ~ 0 ,-4-
where 0 ~ x ~~ is the total constraint on the good, indicating that con-
sumers can buy at most x of tlie good, and 0 ~ R ~~ is the total constraint
on labour, indicating that at most k of labour can be sold. L is the maxi-
mum quantity of labour available. The constrained demand for money m1 is
(2) m1 - u(w,m;X,R) - m t WÁ(W,miX,Q) -~(W,m,X,~,) 7 ~.
Net savings are defined by
(3) s - a(W,m;X,Q) - il(w,m;X,R) - m - wÁ(W,7R;X,Q) - ~(W,m;x,R) .
x-~ and R-~ indicate that there is no constraint on goods or labour.
We call x and R notional (or unconstrained) demand and supply if
X - ~(W,m;W,W) - sup ~(w,m;x,R) ,
X-~
R-~
IC - a(w,m;~,m) - sup a(w,m;x,R) .
x-~
R-~
Since m1 ~ 0 and a(w,m;x,R) ~ L, also ~(w,m;x,R) ~ m t wL.
So both limits exist and are-finite. For ease of notation we write ~(w,m)
and a(w,m) for ~(w,m;~,m) and a(w,m;m,ro). We call x and k effective
demand and supply if
X - ~(w,m;~,k) - sup ~(W,m;x,X.) ,
x-~
(5)
R - a(W,m;X,~) - sup a(w,m;x,k) .
- R~ - -
Effective demand and supply are the quantities that consumers intend to
buy or to sell, gïven a constraint on the other market, but not consider-
ing the own constraint. Clearly effective demand equals notional demand
if there is no constraint on the other market. A constraint x is called
binding at w,m,R , if ~(w,m;x,k) ~~(w,m;~,R). Similarly for fC. The set
of acceptable trades (see Gepts 1977) of consumers is defined by- 5 -
(~) A(w,m) - {X,RI~ X,Á~.:X - ~(W,m;X,R), R - ~(w,m;x,R)}
We make the following assumptions on constrained demand functions;
fcr all w and m:
A1 ~ and a are continuous in all variables; ~ and a are twice different-
iable in w and m and in x and R, for 0 ~ x ~~(w,m), 0 ~ fC ~ a(w,m);
A2 ~(w,m;~,k) ~ 0 p mtwR ~ 0;
a(w,m;x,~) ~ 0 if w~ 0;
A3 ~(w,m;x,R) - min {x,~(w,m;W,k)} for all R. ;
a(w,m;x,R.) - min {R,,a(w,m;x,W)} for all x;
A4
a~(w' ~'m~ ~ 0 for 0 ~ 2 ~ a(w,m) and ~(w,m;~,R) - ~(w,m) for k~ 71(w,m);
aa(w,m;x,~)
~ 0 for 0 ~ x ~~(w,m) and a(w,m;x,W) - a(w,m) for x?~(w,m);
ax - - - - - -
aa(w,m;x,W) ~ 0 for 0 ~ x ~
ax - - E(w,m);
A5
a a(w,m;~,R
~ 0 for 0 ~ k ~ a(w,m); ae
A6
a~(w,m;~,R) ~ ~~d aa(w,m;x,~) ~ 0 for all x,R ; am am - -
A7 if w' ~ w, then ~(w',m;W,k) ~~(w,m;~,R,) and
a;w',m;~,k) ~ a(w ,m;W,R) , for all k.
By A3, consumers buy and sell as much as they can, if the constraint is
binding. By A4, relaxation of a constraint on one market will not lead to
a decrease of demand or supply on the other market. By assumption A5 only
a part of extra labour income, due to a relaxation of the labour constraint,
is used for consumption, whereas only a part of extra consumption possi-
bilities is financed by extra labour supply. A4 and A5 imply:- 6
(7) a~(w'm'W'Q) ~ w and a~(w'm'X'~) ~~ . a~, aX w
From A6, which requires that effective demand of goods and effective supply
of labour increase and decrease respectively, after an increase of m, it
follows that
(8) aa~w'm'~'~) ~ 0 and aa(w,m~X,~) ~ 0 . am am
By A7 an increase of the wage rate will always lead to both an increase of
consumption and of savings (if 2, is binding or not); it implies that wage
income will also increase, (but not necessarily labour supply).
However, these assumptions seem reasonable, they do not straight-
forwardly follow from utility maximizing behaviour of consumers (see Hil-
denbrand and Hildenbrand (1978) and also Van den Heuvel (1979)).
LII~IMA 2.1.: Under assumptions A and if ~(w,m;~,k) ~ x ~~(w,m) and
a(w,m;x,~) ~ k ~ a(w,m), then x-~(w,m) and R - a(w,m)),
Proof: Suppose x ~~(w,m) - x~ -~(w,m;~,1C~), for R~ - a(w,m), by
assumption A4, then by assumption A5: (x~-x) ~ w(k~-IC). If R~ - a(w,m) - SC,
then x~-x ~ 0, a contradiction; so let (R~-k) ~ 0; again by assumption A5:
~ ~ 1 ~
(R -R) ~ w(x -x). Combining the two inequalities gives (x -x) ~(x -x), a
contradiction. 0
PROPOSITIUN 2.2.: Under assumptions A:
A(w,m) -{x,R~O ~ x ~~(w,m;m,R) and 0 ~ R ~ 7~(w,m;x,~)}
Proof: Let x-~(w,m;x,JC) and JC - a(w,m;x,2). We prove x ~~(w,m;m,R,),
the proof for R being similar.
If R, - k, then by A3:
X - ~(W,m;X,R) - ID1n {X,~(w,mim,R)} C ~,(w,mi~~R) ~
So let R, ~ R. Since fC - min {R,a(w,m;x,m)}, we have-T
(i) k - a(w,m;x,~) ~ R
First assume x- x and suppose x~~(w,m;W,R). Considering (i) and lemma
2.1. this implies R- a(w,m) and x-~(w,m), a contradiction since now
x ~ ~(w~m~m~Q) - ~(w~m)~ bY Ah.
For x ~ x, we get, similarly to (i):
(ii) x - ~(w,m;m,2) ~ x .
Now from (i) and (ii), applying lemma 2.1., it follows x-~(w,m) and
R- a(w,m) and that is a contradiction since x-~(w,m;~,k) - ~(w,m) - x,
by A4. p
Any trade ( x,k) E A(w,m) may be chosen by consumers under at most
two constraints; they will choose: ( 1) (~(w,m), J1(w,m)) if there is no
constraint; ( 2) (~(w,m;~,R),k) if R ~ a(w,m) is the only binding constraint;
(3) (x,a(w,m;x,~)), if x ~~(w,m) is the only binding constraint, and (4)
(x,R) in all other cases (with both x and k binding constraints).
PROPOSITION 2.3.: Under the assumptions A, the correspondence A is
continuous and compact valued; ( 0,0) E A(w,m) for all (w,m) and if ~(w,m)~ 0
and a(w,m) ~ 0, then Int A(w,m) ~~.
Proof: Continuity follows from the continuity of ~ and a; since for
all (x,R) E A(w,m), ( x,R) ~ ( w Lt m,L), A(w,m) is compact. By A5 any trade
(x,k) such that x ~~(w,m), R ~ a(w,m) and wk-x - wa(w,m)-~(w,m), is in
the interior of A(w,m). p
2.2. Government
The autonomous demand is g~ 0 and will be assumed fixed troughout
this paper. The government is served by the producer by priority.
2.3. The producer
The firm uses labour input z~ 0 to produce output v~ 0. It does- 8 -
not hold money and does not invest in stock or assets, so there is no
relation between present and future decisions. The technology is given by
a production function
(9) v - f(z) .
We shall assume f to be increasing and differentiable; f' and f" denote
the first and second derivatives of f. Define y- v-g, so y is the output
remaining for consumers aPter fulfilling government demand g. Clearly
-g ~ y ~~; negative values of y mean that production is not sufficient to
fulfil autonomous demand. Let ~ and z be constraints on sales of goods and
on the purchase of labour. ~r is the constrained maximum profit function:
(1C) n(w;~~z) - suP{(Y}6) - wzl(Ytg) - f(z)~ Y~~. z ~ z} .
Notional profit equals n(w;~,~) - n(w), n and y are the constrained supply
and demand corresponces for goods and labour:
n(w;~.,a) -{YI(Yt8) - wf ~(Ytg) - n(w;~~?) and Y ~ Y~ Y ~ f-1(z)},
Y(w;~~z) - f 1(n(w;~~?)f g) .
Notional supply and demand are n(w;~,~) - n(w) and Y(w;W,W) - Y(w). Effect-
ive supply and demand are n(w;W,z) and Y(w;~,~). The set of acceptable
trades of the producer is defined by:
(12) B(w) - {(Y.z)~~~~z : Y - n(w;~.z) and z - f-~(Ytg)} .
Any acceptable trade ( y,z) E B(w) is an optimum under at most one constraint:
a point (y~,z~), such that y~ E n(w) and z~ - f~(y~tg) is optimal without
constraints; any other point is a constrained optímum under either a con-
straint on the good or on labour: if ~fg - f(z), then n(w;~,?) - n(w,~,~) -
n(w;~,z). Clearly B(w) contains all pairs (y,z), such that by a decrease of
the level of activity, proPit cannot be increased, i.e.: if (y,z) E B(w),
then for all (y',z') such that y'fg - f(z') ~ ytg, we have ytg-wf(z) ~
~ y'fg-wf(z').-9-
DEFINITION 2.4.: A production function is called regular if for all
w:
(i) B(w) is closed;
(ii) The projection of B(w)`{-g,0} on the z-axis is an interval.
An example of a production function which is not regular is an in-
creasing function f, such that its second derivative f" is first positive,
then negative and then positive again, when z increases.
2.4. Equilibrium
We consider the economy
(13) E - {f;~,a}
with a single production function f and the functions ~ and a as defined
in (1). The set C(w,m) - A(w,m) n B(w) contains all trades in E which
are acceptable both for consumers and producers. Each (a,b) E C(w,m) re-
quires a suitable rationing scheme, consisting of at most two constraints
on consumers and at most one constraint on the producer. Some (a,b) E C(w,m)
require a constraint on the same market for both consumers and the producer.
In an equilibrium, however, only one of the two can be rationed on the
same market.
DEFINITION 2.5.: An equilibrium at (w,m) in E is a quadruple of trades
(x,2,y,z) and a rationing scheme (x,~,R,z), such that
(i) x-~(w,m;x,R) - y E n(w;~,z) and
R - a(w,m;x,R) - f-~(Y}B) - z
(ii) ~- m or x- m ; z- m or R- W ;
~ or ,y -m .
If ~ and y are functions, then (i) becomes- 10 -
x - ~(w,m;X,Q) - T1(w;~e?) - Y
R - a(w~m;X~R) - Y(w;~~?) - z
The set of equilibria at (w,m) is denoted by e(w,m). So an element of
e(w,m) is the 8-tuple (x,R,y,z;x,R,~,z) satisfying the conditions of de-
finition 2.5. The set of equilibrium trades t(w,m) consists of all pairs
(a,b) E]R2, such that for some rationing scheme,(a,b,a,b;x,R,~,z) E e(w,m).
Note that an equilibrium is defined in such a way that no equilibrium is
possible, where government demand g is not completely satisfied.
By definition 2.5., only the following eight combinations of binding
constraints are permitted:
(~,IC), ( x,z), (x,R), (~), (z), (R), (x), (no constraint) .
Each of these combinations ccrresponds to a particular type of equilibrium:
(K): Keynesian equilibrium: excess supply on both markets; consumers are
rationed on the labour market, producers on the goods market; consumer
demand for goods is insufficient to employ their own labour supply; see
fig. 1.
(I): Repressed inflation equilibrium: excess demand on both markets; con-
sumers are rationed on the goods market, producers on the labour market;
consumers do not supply enough labour to produce their own demand for
goods.
(C): Classícal equilibrium: consumers are rationed on both markets; pro-
ducers realize their notional supply and demand.
(KI): Intermedíate cases between Kernesian and Repressed inflation eguili-
brium; consumers are not rationed and for the producer there is either: a
constraint z on labour or a constraint ~ on goods. These two cases are
equivalent: a constraint z may be replaced by a constraint ~- f(z)-g and
vice versa.
(KC): Intermediate case between Keynesian and classical equilibrium; con-
sumers rationed on the labour market.
(IC): Intermediate case between Repressed Inflation and Classical eguili-
brium; consumers are rationed on the goods market.
(W): Walrasian eguilibrium: no constraints; intermediate case between all
other cases.These equilibria are summarized in table I. They will be called in the




In fig. 1 the shaded area is the set of acceptable trades A(w,m) of con-
sumers and (x~,1C~) -(~(w,m),a(w,m)); the curve connecting (-g,0) and
(y~,z~) -(n(w),y(w)) is the set of acceptable trades B(w) of producers,
for a concave production function. The figure depicts a K-equilibrium
where t(w,m) -(a,b) -(~,R). For each type of equilibrium such a picture
can be drawn; particularly, in a C-equilibrium (y~,z~) is in the interior
of A(w,m) and in a KI-equilibrium B(w) contains (x~,R.~).- 12 -
Table I. Equilibria
~ R- b z- b
~
' ; (K) KEYNESIAN (KI)1 '.
~
,~- a ; x- a ~ y x - à- a ~ y
~
i R~ b- z R- R- b- z
~
i D,C,I D,C,I i
(KC) (W} WALRASIAN ~ (KI)2
I ~ ~ ~ I ~ -x-a-Y x-a-Y x -x-a-Y x
~ ~ ~
R ~ b- z R - R. - b- z
~
2 - 9. - b ~ z
D,C D,C D,C,I




x~ a- y x- a- y x s a- y
X, ~b-z~ R,-b-z~ R-b~ z
D. D,C D,C,I
where
x~ -~(w~m)~ k~ -~(w,m)~ Y~ E n(w)~ z~ - f-1(Y~fB) E Y(w)~
x-~(W,ID~~,R)~ Q-~(W~mix~W)i Y E Tl(W~~,Z)i Z- f-1(Yfg)E Y(WsmeZ)i
x,R,y,z are binding constraints.
D, C and I indicate that the equilibria are possible under decreasing,
constant and increasing returns respectively (sections 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3.).-~3-
Let Q be the set of all pairs (w,m) E]R} , such that an equilibrium exists
at (w,m). We assume (see Bóhm (1978)):
B1 zg ~ a(w,m;0,~) for all ( w,m) ~ 0 and zg - f-~(g) ;
1
B2 a~`(w~mS]c~`~) ~ d(f- (xtK)) for x ~ ~(w,m) . ax áx
LF~~SA 2.6.: Under assumptions A and B and the regularity of f: if
(a,b) E C(w,m) and (a,b) E B(w,m) with (a,b) ~(a,b), then (a,b) E Int A(w,m).
Proof: By A5:
wa - ~(w,m;W,b) ~ wa - ~(w,m;~,b) .
Since (a,b) E C(w,m)
~(w,m;~,b) ~ f(b) - g - a .
Since b ~ b, and (f(b) - g,b) E B(w) ,




~(w,m;m,b) ~ ~(w,m;~,b) - wb t wb ~
~(w,m;~,b) - f(b) t f(b) ~ f(b)- g,
~(w,m;m,b) ~ f(b) - g .
On the other hand, by B1: a(w,m;O,W) ~ zg; since (a,b) E A(w,m):
a(w,m;a,m) ~ b .- 11~ -
By B2 , for 0 ~ a ~ a,
(b) a(w,m;a,W) ~ f-~(a f g) ,
By (a) and (b), (a,b) E Int A(w,m) .
THEOREM 2.7.: Under assumptions A and B and the regularity of f:
(i) Q - 1(W,m)IC(W~m) T ~v}
(ii) at (w,m) E Q there exists a single equilibrium trade t(w,m).
Proof:
(i) Since A(w,m) and B(w) are closed sets by proposition 2.2. and by
regularity, C(w,m) is also closed.
Clearly, Q C{(w,m)IC(w,m) ~~}, So let C(w,m) ~(á. Choose
a- max {YI~z: (y,z) E C(w,m)} and b - f-~(atg) ,
(a) If (a,b) E Int A(w,m), then ( a,b) - t(w,m) and e(w,m) - (a`a,b;
a,b,~,m) is a C-equilibrium.
(S) If (a,b) E Bnd A(w,m), then either:
a-~(w,m;~,b) and b ~ a(w,m;a,W)
and t(w,m) -( a,b) corresponds to a K-equilibrium (when e(w,m) - ( a,b,a,b;
~,b,a,~)), or to a KC-equilibrium, or to a KI-equilibrium, or to a W-
equilibrium, or:
a ~~(w,m;~,b) and b- a(w,m;a,~)
and we have an I-equilibrium with e(w,m) -( a,b,a,b;a,m,~,b) or an ZC-
equilibrium.
(n) Let (a,b) E t(w,m). Suppose (a,b) E t(w,m) with (a,b) ~(a,b).
Then by Lemma 2.cí, (a,b) E Int A(w,m). This implies that consumers are
rationed on both markets and the producer on one market. That contradicts
the definition of an equilibrium.
O- 15 -
Without A5 and the (ad hoc) assumptions B, different equilibria
with different equilibrium trades could occur at (w,m). Note that
(O,zg) E B(w), ensures that Q~~. If the equilibrium trade is unique,
still different equilibria could exist differing only in rationing scheme.
However, we shall treat such equilibria as a single one, and speak about
the equilibrium e(w,m), if t(w,m) is unique, in order to simplify termin-
ology.
3. Eguilibria under different assumptions on production
In thís section we shall consider the equilibria that may occur
(1) under decreasing returns to scale,
(2) under constant returns to scale,
(3) under increasing returns to scale.
3.1. Decreasing returns
This is the case considered in most papers ( BShm (1976), Dehez and
Gabsewícz (1977), Malinvaud (1977)).We assume:
D1 f is continuous and, for z~ 0, twice differentiable;
D2 f(0) - 0 and for z~ 0, f'(z) ~ 0;
D3 f"(z) ~ 0, for z~ 0.
Decreasing returns are defined by D3; by D2 and D3; f is a concave
function.
Under assumptions D, notional supply and demand are decreasing
functions of w. For zg - f 1(g), a- f-1(zg) and B x lim f'(z) -
z-~
- sup {wfyz ~ O:f(z)-wz ~ 0}, we have: -g ~ r1(w) ~ 0 if
w~ a, 0 ~ n(w) ~~ if a ~ w ~ B arri q(w) -~ if w~ s. The set of
acceptable trades is:
B(w) -{Y~z~Ytg - f(z) and y ~ n(w)} .- ~6 -
Clearly f is regular (def. 2.4). Under assumptions D:
n(w;y,W) - min {n(w),~},
n(w;~,z) ~ min {n(w)~f(z)- g} .
No equilibrium can occur at w~ a if g~ 0, for then rl(w,m;~,z) --g,
for all (~,z). (if g- 0, then a trivial equilibrium exists with (a,b) - 0).
For w ~ a, non trivial equilibria may occur under the eight possible
rationing schemes, mentioned in section 2.4. All equilibria sum-
marized in table I, are possible. Under assumptions A, B and D, a unique
equilibrium (trade) exists, by theorem 2.7, for all (w,m) E Q. By B1,
Q-{(w,m)~w ~ a} if g~ 0, and Q-7R} if g- 0, but in the latter case
only trivial C-equilibria occur at w~ a. It was shown by Bóhm (1978)
that under assumptions A, B and D a single pair (w,m) exists, for which
e(w,m) is a W-equilibrium, and that Q can be decomposed into seven regions,
corresponding to the seven types of equilibrium defined above, each region
containing all (w,m) E Q such that e(w,m) is of that type (see fig. 2).
The curves separating the Classical, Keynesian and Repressed Inflation
region correspond to the intermediate equilibria (KC, KI, IC). The slope
of the curve separating the Keynesian and the Classical region is decreas-
ing; the slope of the curve separating the Repressed Inflation and the









As an intermediate case we consider an econo7qy with constant returns,
which are defined by the assumption:
C There exists a~ 0, such that f(z) - az, for z~ 0.
Clearly f'(zg) - a- f'(z), for all z. Now n(w) - 0, if w~ a and
,r(w) -~, if w ~ a and we have
-g if w ~ a
n(w) - {YI-8 ~ Y s"} if w- a
~ if w ~ a
-g if w ~ a
n(w;~,W) - {YI-6 ~ Y ~~} if w- a
~ if w ~ a
g ifw~ a
n(w;",z) - {YI-B ~ Y ~ az -g} if w- a
- ~ az -g - -- if w ~ a- i8 -
whereas Y(w) - á(n(w)tg) etc.
B(w) -
~(-g,0) if w ~ a
I{Y~z~-g ~ Y ~ n(w) ~ z S á(Ytg)} if w ~ a
So f is regular lll(def. 2.~).
At w ~ a, there exists no equilibrium if g~ 0, since n(w) --g.
Only if g- 0, the equilibrium trade t(w,m) -(0,0) corresponds to a
trivial C-equilibrium.
At w- a, W-, KC- and IC-equilibria are possible. The set {w,m~w - a}
is the boundary of Q, if g~ 0(see fig. 3). Producers are not constrained;
note, however, that it is assumed that no rationing scheme is necessary
for producers to select the correct points from the sets n(w) and y(w),
(as is usual in equilibrium theory).
At w ~ a producers are always constrained, since n(w) - y(w) - m. So
only K-, I- and KI-equilibria can occur.
The possible equilibria are summarized in table I(indicated by "C").
w
a
no non trivial equilibrium
iC)
Keynesian 1 Repressed Inflation
- m
fig. 3
Under assumptions A, B and C, Q-{(w,m)~w ~ a} if g~ 0. The decom-
position of Q is depicted in fig. 3, which may be compared with fig. 2.
The point W, corresponding to a W-equilibrium is unique and by theorem
2.7 equilibria are unique for all (w,m) E Q.- ~9 -
3.3. Increasing returns
In the case of increasing returns, at given prices and wages, there
is a minimum amount of sales necessary to make production profitable.
Above this minimum, profit increases with sales. This implies, that pro-
duction is either not profitable at all, or the producer tries to maxi-
mize sales. So, the producer has always to be rationed, if prices are
such that production is at all profitable.
Increasing returns are defined by the increase of the mean output
per unit of labour input, or, equivalently, by the decrease of inean labour
input per unit of output. Let f(z) - f(z)~z be the mean output function.
f'(z) and f"(z) denote the first and second derivatives of f. We assume:
I1 f is continuous and f is twice differentiable at z such that
f(z) ~ 0;
I2 f(0) - 0 and P(z) ~ 0 for all z~ 0;
I3 f(z) ~ 0 implies f'(z) ~ 0. -
Bij I1 it is allowed that f(z) - 0 for some z ~ 0. (See remark below).
Assumption I3 defines increasing returns. Clearly I3 implies that
f'(z) ~ 0 for f(z) ~ 0.
Let d- lim f(z); d may be infinite. We define two functions y and n
z-~
of the interval [O,d[ into]R: the minimum demand function Y for labour is
defined by:
(14) Y(w) - min {z~z ~ 0 and f(z)-wz i 0} for 0 ~ w ~ d;
the minimum supply function of goods is n(w) - f(y(w)) - g. (See fig. 4).
y is the inverse of the mean output function;since
(15) z E y(w) p w- f(z) ,
Y(w) - f -~ (w) and n(w) - f(f -~ (w) ) - g - wy(w) - g .-zo-
Production is profitable only if sales of goods and available labour are
above r1(w) and y(w). At w~ d production is not profitable at any level.
Clearly





RE~IARK: Increasing returns are consistent with the existence of a
fixed minimum labour input (fixed costs). Let z~ be the minimum input,
then there exists an increasing function h, such that
f(z) -
0 if z ~ z~
h(z-z~) ~ 0 if z~ z~
Also f(z) ~ 0 if and only if z ~ z~. Now y(0) - z~ and y(w) ~ z~, if w~ 0.
If there are no fixed costs, then f(z) ~ 0 for z~ 0. Now, for
~- lim f(z) ~ 0, y(~) - 0 and for 0 ~ w ~ ~p, y(w) - 0. Note that in the
z~
non-fixed costs-case, f'(z) ~ 0 is equivalent to f"(z) ~ 0, i.e. to the
convexity of the production function.
a
For profits we have: n(w) - 0 if w~ á and n(w) - m if w ~ b;




I~ if w ~ d
.
-8 if w~ d or ~ ~ n(w)
y, if w ~ d and Zr i ~(w)
-~-g if w~ d or z ~ y(w)
n(w;~,z)
~ f(z)-g if w ~ d and z~ y(w)
and y(w) - f 1(n(w)tg),l etc. The set of acceptable trades is
(17) B(w) -
(-g,0) if w ~ d
{(y,z)lytg S f(z) and z~ y(w)} if w ~ d
So f is regular ( def. 2.4); hence by theorem 2.7, under assumptions A, B
and I, an equilibrium is unique for all ( w,m) E Q.
PROPOSITION 3.1.: Under the assumptions A, B and I;
(i) (w,m) E Q p( n(w)eY(w)) E A(w,m)~
(ii) Q is a closed set,
(iii) if ( w,m) E Bnd Q, then t(w,m) - ( n(w),Y(w).
Proof: Let (y,z) - (n(w),y(w)).
(i) If (y,z) E A(w,m), then C(w,m) ~~, hence by theorem 2.7,
(w,m) E Q, Suppose (y,z) ~ C(w,m) but (y,z) E C(w,m). Then (y,z) ~(y,z)
and this implies by lemma 2.6, that (y,z) E Int A(w,m), a contradiction.
(u) By proposition 2.3, A is a continuous correspondence, whereas by
assumption I, the funetion w;(n(w),Y(w)) is continuous. So if (wt,mt) ;-22-
i(w,m) for t; m, and (wt,mt) E Q for all t, then (n(wt),Y(wt)) E
E A(wt,mt), for all t and therefore (~(w),Y(w)) E A(w,m), hence ( w,m) E Q.
(iii) As a consequence of (ii), if (w,m) E Bnd Q, then (yr,z) E Bnd A(w,m)
and hence ( y,z} E t(w,m). ~
Since ~ and a are non decreasing in R and x respectively, by assumptions
A4, it follows from (i) of proposition 3.1, that an equilibrium exists at
(w,m), if and only if simultaneously:
(i8) ~(w,mS`~,Y(w)) ? n(w) and a(w,m4n(w),m) ~ Y(w) .
At w~ d, no non trivial equilibrium can occur. Only if g- 0, a
trivial C-equilibrium exists with t(w,m) - 0 and R- x- 0.
So non trivial equilibria only occur at w ~ d. Since at w ~ d,
n(w) - Y(w) -~, the producer has always to be rationed. Hence W-, C-,
KC-, and IC-equilibria are impossible. This leads to the following
theorem:
THEOREM 3.2.: Under assumption A and I all equilibrie with non zero
production are K-, I-, or KZ-equilibria.
At values w ~ d no equilibrium occurs, if demand for goods is smaller
than minimum profitable supply, or supply of labour is smaller than mini-
mum labour demand. In that case A(w,m) n B(w) -~. (Fig. 5, see also
fig. 1)
fig. 5- 23 -
By (iii) of proposition 3.1, the boundary (relative to R}) of the set
Q gives equilibria where the firm only realizes its minimum profitable
sales and therefore has zero-profits. There are three types of boundary
cases:
~(w,m;~,b) - n(w) - a and a(w,m) ~ y(w) - b (K-equilibrium)
(19) ~(w,m) ~ n(w) - a and a(w,m;a,~) - Y(w) - b (I-equilibrium)
~(w,m) - r1(w) - a and ~(w,m) - y(w) - b (KI-equilibrium)
The last case bears some similarity to Walrasian equilibrium in the case
of non increasing returns. It is a boundary case to all other cases and
its position in the pictures of Q(see fig. 5), is similar to the one of
W-equilibrium in fig. 2 and particularly 3. Therefore we shall call such
a KI-equilibrium where consumers are not rationed and producers realize
their minimum profitable sales, a pseudo-Walras equilibrium, abreviated
PW-equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section we consider the shape and the com-
position of the set Q.
First note that Q~~ under assumption A, B and I: let wg - f(zg),
then Y(wg) - zg and n(wg) - 0. By A2, ~(w,m;W,zg) ~ 0 for all m and by
B2, 1(w,m;O,W) ~ zg, for all m; so by theorem 2.7, (wg,m) E Q for all m.
It also follows that (w,m) E Q for all m and w ~ w.
- g
If e(w,m) is a boundary K-equilibrium, and m ~ m, then (w,m) ~ Q: by
A6:
~(w~m~~~Y(w)) ~ ~(w~m;meY(w)) - n(w) .
If e(w,m) is a boundary I-equilibrium and m ~ m, then (w,m) ~ Q:
again by A6:
a(w~m~n(w)~m) ~ a(w~món(w)~~) - Y(w).- 2k -
This implies that a PW-equilibrium e(w,m) is unique given w: no
(iw,m) with m~ m is in Q.
If (w,m~) and (w,m2) are in Q and m~ ~ m ~ m2, then (w,m) E Q:
n(w) ~ ~(w,m~3"~Y(w)) ~ ~(w~m~m~Y(w)) ~ ~(w~m2S~~Y(w))
a(w,m~~n(w)~~) ~ a(w~m6n(w)~~) ~ l(w,m2;Tl(w)~~) ~ Y(w) .
Given (w,m) E Q, then by A6:
(i) either (w,0) E Q, or for some 0 ~ m' ~ m, e(w,m') is a boundary
K-equilibrium;
(ii) if m' ~ m and (w,m') ~ Q, then there exists m", such that e(w,m")
is a boundary I-equilibrium for m ~ m" ~ m'.
If e(w,m~) and e(w,m2) are a K-equilibrium and an I-equilibrium
respectively, then m~ ~ m2 and there exists m~ ~ m ~ m2, such that e(w,m)
is a KI-equilibrium (with consumers not rationed).
On the bounda of 2 ry Q w.r.t. ~tt equilibrium trades satisfy t(w,m) -
-(n(w),y(w)), by proposition 2.7. Boundary K-equilibria and PW-equili-
bria lie on a curve, where w is an increasing function of m.




for i - 1,2
and w~ ~ w2, then m~ ~ m2 .
Proof: By A7 and A6 respectively
) - ~(w2~m~;"~Y(w2)) ~
w2 min (Y(w2),1(w~~m~)) - ~(w~em~~~~Y(w2)) ~
w~Y(w~) - ~(w~em~;~eY(w~)) - B-25-
hence
~(w2~m~i"~Y(w2)) ~ w2Y(w2)-g - ~(w2~m2;~~Y(w2))
and since
a~(w'm'm'~) ~ 0, we have m~ m.
am 2 1
To say more we need two assumptions:
E1 a(w,m) is concave in w, for all m;
E2 f(z) ~ 0~ f"(z) c 0.
E2 requires that returns do not increase toofast. Particularly consider
f(z) - za, a~ 1; then i(z) - za-~, f"(z) z(a-1)(a-2)za-3; now ~"'(z)~ 0,
if a ~ 2. E2 implies that y(w) is convex: by I3 and E2, f is concave and
since y(w) - f-~(w) , y is a convex function.
Let P-{w,m~11(w,m) ~ y(w)}. Clearly Q C p. The upper boundary of P
is given by a function h-7R}-~2t, where the boundary of P consists of
(h(m),m) for all m, and a(h(m),m) - y(h(m). Now h is a decreasing function
of m, since
(i) h is defined for each m~ 0: by assumption A2: a(wg,m) ~ y(wg)
and for wL - P(L) we have a(wL,m) ~ L- y(wL). By continuity of a and y,
there exists w, such that a(w,m) - y(w), and this w is unique by the con-
cavity of a and the convexity of y.
(ii) h is decreasing in m: let F(w,m) - a(w,m) - y(w)). Then at (w,m)
such that F(w,m) - 0, we have
aF a~(w,m) a~ Y(w) ~ C~
aw - aw - aw
by concavity and convexity, and by A5:
aF a(w,m) ~ ~ .
am - aw
Hence ~ ~ 0 .
If e(w,m) is a PW-equilibrium, then a(w,m) - Y(w), hence ( w,m) is on
the curve h, which is decreasing. Now from proposition 3.3. it Pollows
that (w,m) giving a PW-equilibrium is unique. There are four cases:- 26 -
(a) For no (w,m) E Q, e(w,m) is a PW-equilibrium and for all
(w,m) E Bnd Q, e(w,m) is a boundary K-equilibrium. Now the boundary of Q
can be described by a curve where w is an increasing function of m.
(b) For no (w,m) E Q, e(w,m) is a PW-equilibrium and for all
(w,m) E Bnd Q, e(w,m) is a boundary I-equilibrium.
(c) (h(0),0) E Q and e(h(0),0) is the unique PW-equilibrium; all
other points on Bnd Q give boundary I-equilibria.
(d) For some m~ 0, e(h(m),m) is the unique PW-equilibrium. In this
case for some w0 ~ h(m), e(w0,0) is a boundary K-equilibrium and an in-
creasing curve joining (w0,0) and (h(m),m) consists of boundary points of
Q giving boundary K-equilibria. All boundary points of Q where m~ m,
give boundary I-equilibria. This part of Bnd Q lies completely below the
curve h. In this case the picture of Q looks like the one given in fig. 6.
fig. 6
4. Equilibria with many firms and increasing returns
m
We consider an economy EN -{N,fj;~,a}. Consumers are defined by the
constrained demand and supply funetions ~ and 1(1). N-{1,2,...,n} is a
finite set of potential firms.n is the set of all subsets of N. Each
j E N has a production fluiction f.(z.). We only consider the increasing
J J
returns case so assumptions I are satisfied by all fj. nj,Yj~nj and Yj
are as defined in (1~) and (16). For sake of simplicity we assume g- 0 in
this section. A(temporary) fixed price equilibrium in EN is defined as-27-
follows (by assumptions I all n and y are functions):
DEFINITION 4.1.: An equilibrium at (w,m) in ~, is a 2(nt1)-tuple of
trades(x,2,yj,zj) and a rationing scheme ( x,R,,~j,zj), for j E N, such that:
(i) x-~(w,m;x,2) - Eyj and R- a(w,m;x,A.) - Ezj ;
(ii) li~- Yj - nj(w;~j,zj) and zj - Yj(w;~j~?j) :
(iii) Ib'j: ~j - ~~ or x - ~;(tlj: zj - ~l or R ;
(iv) yj: [~j - ~ or zj - m] .
The set of equilibria at (w,m) is denoted by eN(w,m) and equilibrium trades
are now defined by tN(w,m) -{x,k,~j,zj ~~(x,R,,yj,zj): (x,k,yj,zj;x,k,Ljzj)} E
E eN(w,m)}.
- - - - -
Since we assume increasing returns, all firms have to be rationed. If
in eN(w,m), yj ~~ and zj -~, then yj -~j if ~j ~ n(w) and yj - 0 if
~j ~ n(w), and similarly if labour is constrained. A firm which cannot make
a non-negative profit has to leave the market. So in an equilibrium it is
also determined which firms have a positive production. Such firms will be
called active.
The equilibria that are possible with different firms are the ones
considered in section 3.3 for a single firm: (i) K-equilibrium (all firms
rationed on the goods market and consumers rationed on the labour market);
(ii) I-equilibrium (all firms rationed on the labour market and consumers
on the goods market) and (iii) an intermediate case of KI-equilibria (con-
sumers not rationed snd all firms rationed on one market, but not necessari-
ly the same). If in the last case some firms are rationed on the goods mar-
ket and the other ones on the labour market, that rationing scheme could be
replaced by one with all firms rationed on the same market, e.g. by repla-
cing constraints zj by ~j - fj(zj), without affecting the equilibrium trades.-2g-
4.1. Market share distributions
At any (w,m) E Q many equilibria can exist, differing not only in
rationing schemes, but also in equilibrium trades and in the composition
of the set of active firms. Up to now, no restrictions have been put on
the rationing schemes and thus on the rules by which the distribution
among firms of sales or available labour is determined. A complete des-
cription of the economy certainly requires rules of this type. Therefore
we introduce market share distributions for goods and labour. The idea
behind this concept (applied in a partial equilibrium model in Weddepohl
(1978)) is that, if there is excess supply of goods, each consumer has to
decide from which firm he will try to buy first (and because of increasing
returns he certainly will be served). The decisions of all consumers will
lead to a specific distribution of sales among firms. In the case of excess
demand for goods this distribution does not matter, for consumers will
address themselves to different firms consecutively. Similarly the choice
of an employer by consumers will generate a market share distribution of
labour. Clearly these distributions also depend on which firms are in the
market, i.e. are active.
Let T-{Ti E g~nlri ~ 0, Eii - 1} be the unit simplex. Firstly
p:~-~ T U{0} is the market share distribution of ~ood's sales. It associa-
tes to each set of active firms H C N, the share of each firm in H of the
sales of goods, if there is excess (effective) supply, i.e. if Y is the
aggregate constraint on sales, then each (active) firm j E H has the share
pi(H) and therefore his constraint is ~j - pi(H)~ (for j~ H, pj(H) - 0).
Secondly 0:~-; T U{0} is the market share distribution of labour. It
associates to a set H C N the share of each j E H of labour supply, if
there is excess (effective) demand for labour. Hence, given the aggregate
constraint z, each firm's constraint on labour will be 0j(H)z - zj (for
j~ H, Bj(H) -~).On the market share distributions we assume:
M1 p(H) -OpH-Qi; 0(H) -OpH-~
M2 j E H C H' and H~ H' ~[pj(H) ~ pj(H') and Bj(H) ~ Bj(H')j-29-
Among the equilibria in EN (def. ~.1), only a subset will respect
given market share distributions and only these equilibria can realize if
the market share distributions dictate the distribution of good's sales or
labour among firms. We define equilibria of this type for each set H C N
of active firms.
in E- , such that
(i)
DF.FINITION 4.2.: eH(w,m) C eN(w,m) for H C N, is the set of equilibria
if yj: ~j ~~, then yj: ~rj - pj(H)x ,
(ii) if yj: zj ~~, then yj: zj - 6j(H)1', .
Note that pj(H) - 9j(H) - 0, if j~ H. (i) obtains if all firms are con-
strained on the o g ods market (so at a K- of KI-equilibrium), (ii) if all
firms are constrained on the labour market (so at an I- or KI-equilibrium).
The definition does not allow equilibria where some firms are rationed
on the goods market and other firms on the labour market, unless e.g.
zj - 6j(H)k may be replaced by ~j - fj(zj), which requires ~j - pj(H)x. To
include this case would require a refinement of our concept of market share
distribution, in order to allow for the distribution of the "unused" part
of some firm's share among the other firms, in order to determine ~. and
J
zj. This problem is considered in a different paper (Weddepohl, 1979). In
the present paper we shall not pursue this matter further; in section 4.3.
we consider a special case where the problem is ruled out.
Given an equilibrium in eH(w,m) there will, under suitable assumptions,
also exists an equilibrium in eH,(w,m).H' C H. There may also exist an
equilibrium for H' ~ H, and particularly it may be profitable for a non
active firm to become active. We define
DEFINITION 4,3,: The equilibria eH(w,m) are stable w.r.t. H, if there
exists no j~ H, such that there exists an equilibrium in eH Uj(w,m) where
j makes a positive profit.
If an equilibrium is not stable, a non-active firm could make a positive
profit, if it realizes its market share, i.e. by becoming active. We shall-30-
study stability in section 4.3. for the special case, where all firms are
identical.
4.2. Aggregate production functions
Given a set of active firms H C N and the market shares pj - pj(H)
and 9j - 6j(H), we can define two aggregate production functions, giving
total output as a function of total labour input:
(i) If labour is rationed and distributed among firms in H according
to shares 9j, then
(?0) fRH - E fj(9jz)
H
for z total labour input. Now
PRH - E 6jfj(6jz)
H
If assumptions I hold for all j E N, then fRH also satisfies I, particular-
ly (for I3):
fRH - E 9~ f~(9jz) ~ 0
H
Similarly E3 holds for f~H if it does for all j.
(u) If o g ods are rationed for firms and sales are distributed among
active firms in H C N according to shares p. - p.(H), then f is defined
J ~ gH
by:
(21) f8H(y) - E pjf~1(Pjy)
H
y being total goods sales. Now also assumptions I and E2 hold for fgM if
they hold for all fj.
Both with the help of f~H and fgH the (constrained) demand and supply
functions ngH and YgH (see (16)) can be defined. The minimum profitable
sales and labour input functions (see (14)) are defined, however, by
n.(w) Y.(w)
(22) ngH(w) - min P-, YRH(w) - min é
H ~ H ,7- 31 -
for then we have for all j E H:
pjngH(w) i nj(w) .
Clearly fRH and fgH need not coincide.
We define two "single firm" economies.
(23) EgH - {fgH~~,a} and
ERH - {fRH~E,a} ,
as defined in section 2.3. and studied in section 3.3. for the increasing
returns case, with equilibrium sets egH(w,m) and eRH(w,m) (see definition
2.5.). Let (x,fC,yj,zj;W,R,yj,m) E eH(w,m) be a K-equilibrium (or a KI-
equilibrium with R. -~) in EN, then (x,R,Eyj,Ezj;m,R,E~j,W) E egH(w,m) is
a K-equilibrium or a KI-equilibrium in E H. The converse is also true. Si-
g
milarly an I- or a KI-equilibrium, with all firms rationed on the labour
market, from eH(w,m) in EN, is equivalent to an I- or KI-equilibrium Prom
eRH(w,m) in ERH.
The production function to be used depends on the type of equilibrium
obtained. It could occur that at some (w,m), an I-equilibrium exists in ERH
and that simultaneously in EgH there exists a K-equilibrium. Then clearly
eH(w,m) contains both a K- and an I-equilibrium. It could also happen that
at (w,m), ERH only has a K-equilibrium and that Egh only has an I-equili-
brium. In that case eH(w,m) - QS. It seems that for the definition of an
equilibrium in such a case an extension of the market share concept as con-
sidered above is required with firms rationed on different markets.
~.3. Identical firms
Let all firms have the same production flznction f, satisfying assump-
tions I, and have identical market shares. For IH~ denoting the number of
members of H C N, define h- IHI and n- ~N~. Now ~ E N: fj(zj) - f(zj)
and given a set H of active firms, for all j E H: 0j(H) - h- pj(H) and
for j ~ H: 9j(H) - 0- pj(H). Clearly p and 6 satisfy assumptions M1 and
M2.
We need only consider the number of active firms, in the set H,
its composition being irrelevant. There exists a single aggregate produc-
tion function for a given n~imber h of active firms, since fgh and fRh, as-32-
defined in (20) and (21),coincide:
(24) fh(z) - hf(h z)
Let n and y be the minimum supply and demand functions w.r.t. f(see
(14) ), then ~.h and y h w.r.t, fh satisfy:
(25) nh(w) - hn(w) and Yh(w) - h Y(w).
For given h, we may limit ourselves to the single firm economy Eh -
-{fh;~,a} (see (13)) with equilibrium sets etl(w,m) and equilibrium trade
th(w,m) since the equilibria in Eh are equivalent to the ones in EN, satis-
fying definition 4.2. (i.e. equilibria from eH(w,m) for ~HI - h). Clearly
if (a,b) E th(w,m), then an equilibrium in eh(w,m) will be such that
x- a;R - b;yj - a~h and zj - b~h if j E H;yj - zj - 0 if j~ H. We can
apply the analysis of section 3.3. for studying h firm equilibria. Let Qh
be the set of (w,m) pairs such that an equilibrium exists in Eh at
(w,m);Q~1 will have the properties found in section 3.3. if assumptions
A, B and I and eventually E hold. By assumptions I2 and I3:
(26) fh(z) ~ fhtl(z)
since ~ f(z) - h f(~ z) - f(~ z) ~ f(~ z) -~ f (z) . z h z h h ht1 z ht1
This implies:
Yh(w) ` Yht1(w) and nh(w) ~ nh}1(w) .
We are now able to compare the equilibria for different numbers of
active firms. An equilibrium eh(w,m) is stable, according to definition
4.3. if and only if (w,m) E Qh`Int Q,h}1 (since boundary points of
Qht1
give zero profits for all firms). Under assumptions A, B and I, equilibrium
trades are unique, so th(w,m) in Eh is a singleton. Theorem 4.4. gives the
relations between equilibria at (w,m) for different h. Note that assump-
tions B hold for all h ~ n, if they hold for fn, due to (26).-33-
THEORII~I 4.4.: Under the assumptions A, B and I:
(i ) Qh C Q.h-1 ;
(ii) if (w,m) E Bnd Q,h, then (w,m) E Int Q,h-1;
(iii) if eh(w,m) is a K-ora KI-equilibrium,then eh-1(w,m) is a K-equí~l~rium;
N
(iv) if eh(w,m) is an I- or a KI-equilibrium and (w,m) E Qht1, then
ehtl(w'm) is an I-equilibrium.
Proof:
(i) Since (w,m) E Qh,(nh(w),yh(w)) E A(w,m), by proposition 3.1 ,
and therefore a(w,m;nh(w),m) ? Y(w) - fh1(n(w)). Since nh-1(w) ~ nh(w)
and by B1, B2 and (26),
(a) ~(w,m;nh-1(w)~ ) ~ fh1(nh-1(w)) ~ fh11(nh-1(w)) - Yh-1(w).
Also ~(w,m;~,yh(w)) ~ nh(w). By assumption A4, particularly (7), since
nh(w)- nh-1(w) - w(Yh(w)- Yh-1(w)), it follows
(b) ~(w,m;~,Yh-1(w)) ' nh-1(w) .
So by (a), (b) and proposition 3.1., (w,m) E Qh-1 .
(ii) If (w,m) E Bnd Qh, then (nh(w),Yh(w)) E Bnd A(w,m). By (a) and (b)
of (i), nh-1(w),yh-2(w)) E Int A(w,m).
(iri) Let eh(w,m) be a K- or KI-equilibrium. Then Por all v ~~(w,m),
a(w,m;v,~) - fh1(v), by B1 and B2. Since fh11(w) ~ fh1(v) for all v~ 0,
a(w,m;v,~) ~ f 1(v), for all v ~~(w,m), hence e (w) is a K-equilibrium.
h-1 - h-1
(iv) if eh}1(w,m) would be a K- or a KI-equilibrium, then by (iii)
eh(w,m) would be a K-equilibrium. ~
Theorem 4.4. entails, together with the results of section 3.3., that
the set Q,h shifts upwards if h inereases, as shown in figure 7. Note that
(iii) ~f theorem 4 implies that the PW-equilibrium pair (w,m) increases
in both w and m, and that the right hand boundary of the Keynesian region
shifts to the right. So generally a sufficiently large increase of the
real wage rate will cause that some firms have to leave the market. Con-
versely a decrease of real wages will attract new firms into the market.
I1ue to the more efficient use of labour by less firms, an increase of wages
with decrease of the number of firms, may cause that an I-equilibrium is





Typically under increasing returns only equilibria can exist where
at least the producers are rationed, so that Walrasian and Classical equi-
libria are excluded. The model considered in this paper is, however, very
restrictive, since no investment is possible. It may be argued that fixed
capital ought to be included in the model and that it is more likely than
that the short run production function shows decreasing returns. In that
case increasing returns are rather a long run phenomenon. Now increasing
returns come into the picture when investment decisions are to be made,
i.e. when it must be decided how much equipment and of what type shall be
ordered. For these decisions not only the expected wages and prices ought
to be taken into account, but also the expected rationing of goods sales
and labour, and it will precisely be these constraints that limit the
purchase of new equipment. Therefore it seems that, however with fixed
capital and a decreasing returns-short run production funetion Classical
and Walrasian equilibrium may occur, such equilibria cannot persist as
soon as capital may be adjusted, if the long run-production function shows
increasing returns, (even if prices and wages also vary).
We only considered fixed price equilibria in this paper. The model of
section 4 seems also appropriate for the analysis of price making behaviour
of firms. The stability concept of definition 4.3 should be extended by
introducing the conditions under which no firm is inclined to change its
price. (For a partial analysis see Weddepohl (1978, 1979).
It must be noted that the market shares, as introduced in section 4.1,
may also be applied if there are decreasing returns and if the producers
are rationed. These shares could vary over time, not only as a result of-35-
entry and exit of firms, but also as a function of selling activities by
the firms.
All these problems need further research. In models where more than
a single period is considered, the assumption that profits are transferred
to the autonomous sector, is not reasonable. It should either be distri-
buted among firms or have some relation to new investment.
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